Flash Point Matters
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Dear Fabulous Frog,
Why is the flash point of a rejuvenation fluid even relevant? The temperature of an electrical arc is 35,000°F – everything is flammable from the utility standpoint, just as we know that nothing is unbreakable from a lineman’s viewpoint.
West Coast New Yorker
Standards Engineering
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Editors Note: It has been my practice to keep my posts to no more than a single page. I had to depart from that practice on this post, because the topic was too hot and too integrated to split into several smaller posts. The time spent on this prose will be worthwhile.
-T. B. Frog
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Dear Ms. Yorker-
That’s a really interesting question and a great learning opportunity. I touched upon this subject in two previous posts in 2010 and 2011, but 2012 is a new year so let’s take a fresh and more comprehensive look.
Before we dive out of the frying pan and into the fire, I want to comment on the quip, “… unbreakable from a lineman’s viewpoint.” Linemen take great pride on being able to break anything, and as we shall see later, the fallibility of equipment, the inevitability of equipment failure (whether or not that failure is encouraged by rough handling of burley line-personnel), the certainty that fluid will one day be released into the confined volume of your pad-mounted transformer, are precisely why this issue is so important.
Let’s reproduce a table of closed cup flash points from the November 2, 2011 post, because the values are very important. The materials with a red background are defined as flammable liquids by OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1200(c) and DOT 49 CFR 173.115-120.
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Material
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Flash Point
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CableCURE®/SD fluid
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32°F (0°C)
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CableCURE®/XL fluid
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55°F (13°C)
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Jet Fuel A
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100°F (38°C)
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Perficio™ 011 fluid
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142°F (61°C)
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Ultrinium™ 732 fluids
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>142°F (61°C)
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CableCURE®/DMDB fluid
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174°F (79°C)
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Ultrinium™ 733 fluids
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>248°F (120°C)
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It’s also important to understand what a closed cup flash point represents. Referring to ASTM D93-10 (Standard Test Method for Flash Point by Pensky-Martens Closed Cup Tester), a sample of fluid is placed in a closed metal cup at a temperature well below its flash point. The fluid and the air/vapor space above the fluid are well mixed as the temperature of the cup and its contents are uniformly increased at a prescribed rate of 5 to 6°C (9 to 11°F) per minute. A small shutter is opened at each 1°C increment, and an ignition source is lowered quickly (0.5 seconds) into the vapor space of the test cup. The ignition source lingers in its lowered position for 1 second. It is then quickly raised and the shutter is closed. This process is repeated until the vapor-air mixture flashes. The ignition source might be a propane flame or a spark. The temperature of the ignition source has zero impact on the flash point. That’s right, it does not matter what the temperature of an arc is – it may be 35,000°F or 35 million. It’s the temperature of the fluid that determines whether an ignition occurs.

Here’s why that is the case. I think everybody is familiar with the “fire triangle,” I illustrate nearby. In order for a fire or explosion to occur, there must be three things: A source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen. Part of Ms. Yorker’s point is that in medium and high voltage environments, sources of ignition are common. Of course, oxygen is also ubiquitous and hence the only thing that is missing to create a fire or explosion is the fuel. But just having fuel is still not enough! As we discussed previously, a spill of fluid (fuel) is inevitable, despite Herculean engineering and procedural efforts to prevent that event. For now, let’s assume the spill does occur from a tank failure, a failure of one of the fittings, the tubing, or an injection elbow. What happens next? Check out Frogograph 1 nearby. The fluid will flow to the lowest point of the transformer enclosure. There may be a puddle or perhaps just fluid-wetted soil. In Frogograph 1, the temperature at the bottom of the transformer is lower than the flash point. The flash point is indicated by the red “FP” arrow. Because the temperature is well below the flash point, there will not be enough fluid evaporation to reach the lower explosive limit (LEL). I’m perfectly safe standing there drinking my coffee.

The situation changes in Frogograph 2 as the temperature just exceeds the flash point. Now in addition to the blue liquid layer, there are three other possible strata, labeled <LEL, Goldilocks, and >UEL. Let’s start from the bottom – the UEL is the upper explosive limit. All flammable fluids require a threshold amount of oxygen to burn. As a practical matter, this light green stratum is very, very shallow and since the likely sources of ignition are higher within the enclosure, its presence is largely irrelevant. Now let’s jump to the uppermost stratum left clear in the illustrations. In this stratum there may be some molecules of evaporated fluid, but there simply is not enough to ignite in a self-propagating chain reaction. It’s the red stratum, the “Goldilocks” zone, where there is just enough (not too much and not too little) fuel (vaporized fluid) and just enough (not too much and not too little) oxygen to support combustion. Because the transformer enclosure is not well ventilated and because the flammable vapors are heavier than air, these strata form at the bottom as illustrated. When a fluid vaporizes, its volume increases about 1000-fold, so even a small spill has the potential to create a large Goldilocks stratum. The rate of fluid evaporation is related to the difference between the temperature at the bottom of the enclosure and the flash point. The higher the flash point, the lower the rate of evaporation will be. There are three things that mitigate an increase in depth of the Goldilocks zone. Gravity will draw the spilled fluid into the soil. Secondly, enclosures are not air-tight and hence restrained convection will remove some of the vapor. Thirdly, my favorite law of thermodynamics, the 2nd law or entropy, helps disperse the spill. Both liquid and vapor diffuse through air and soil acting to reduce the concentration of the fluid vapors. The Goldilocks stratum is checked by these three phenomena. For a given spill, the depth of the Goldilocks stratum will be determined by the difference between the temperature at the bottom of the enclosure and the flash point.

In Frogograph 3 the temperature is well above the flash point and the Goldilocks stratum is much larger. In this illustration, we imagine that the neutral bleed wire to the elbow does not make an adequate electrical connection and discharges occur at that point. As the Goldilocks stratum enlarges it eventually reaches this discharge and the Goldilocks volume ignites. Because the transformer provides mechanical confinement an explosion occurs and the lid is blown open violently. That is precisely what happened in the photograph nearby to an Ohio circuit owner. Fortunately, no tadpoles were playing nearby.


Now go back to the flash point table above. Does the temperature in your transformer enclosures ever exceed 55°F (13°C)? Unless you are on the North Slope of Alaska, the answer is probably yes. If Alaska Airlines asks if they can store one gallon of jet fuel A in each of your enclosures, would you say yes? The jet fuel would be safer than the low flash point injection fluids.
How many fires and explosions would be too many on your system? Some may be stammering, “But, … but, we have never had a fire or explosion with the flammable rejuvenation fluid we have used in the past.” Lucky you … others have! As a standards engineer you should demand that all suppliers provide a complete accounting of all fires and explosions its process and fluid have ever experienced. If a vendor is unwilling to comply with this most reasonable request, you can disqualify that supplier. Let me preemptively supply the Novinium list … boring as it may be.
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Novinium fires and explosions (as of October 18, 2012)
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Event Date
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Event Description
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A partial compilation of fires and explosions suffered by circuit owners utilizing flammable rejuvenation fluid can be found at …
http://www.novinium.com/pdf/papers/Rejuvenation_Hazards_Analysis.pdf
... in Addendum C of the Rejuvenation Hazards Analysis, beginning at section 2.3.3. Specific examples are illustrated at 2.3.3.1.3b, 2.3.3.1.3.1.2c, 2.3.3.2.1c, and 2.3.3.2.2c. There are many more.
Thankfully, most of us have never been in a head-on auto accident, but we take comfort in the PPE designed into our cars, namely the seat belts and air-bags. We pay more for these features on our cars, not because we have had a serious accident, but because we wish to avoid the terrible consequences of such an event should it occur. Even better than seat belts and air bags, imagine a system that eliminated the risk of collision altogether.
Such a system is available to circuit owners enjoying the capital efficiency of rejuvenation. My final illustration in this post is the “Hierarchy of Control” nearby. The upside-down pyramid illustrates that the most effective way to deal with safety risks is to eliminate them. At Novinium we embrace this hierarchy and you should too. Eliminate known risks, substitute safer materials and processes for those that are less safe. Apply concentrated engineering effort to prevent occurrences and mitigate the impact when unfortunate and inevitable incidents do occur. Implement, but depend the least on administrative, behavior-based, and PPE controls.

With flash points greater than 142°F for Novinium’s Perfico™ 011 fluid and Ultrinium ™ 732 fluids (both of which enjoy patented methods including U.S. patents 7,658,808, 7,700,871 and 8,101,034 together with their foreign equivalents), fires are extraordinarily unlikely. But we don’t stop there. With our improved unsustained pressure rejuvenation (iUPR) we eliminate the 60 to 90 day soak period employed by the two-decade-old approach altogether. That’s about a 60-fold reduction in the exposure to a leak in the first place. With our patented sustained pressure rejuvenation (SPR) process (U.S. patents 7,615,247 and 8,205,326 and foreign equivalents) and associated injection adaptors (U.S. patents 7,195,504, 7,538,274 and 7,683,260 and foreign equivalents), the possibility of a leak is entirely eliminated. There’s more – a lot more. To understand how technology has vastly improved the safety performance of rejuvenation technology, see …
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A Comparison of Rejuvenation Hazards January 19,2011
- Hazard-by-hazard analysis of commercially significant rejuvenation technologies used for URD cables
- Differences between sustained pressure rejuvenation (SRP) and unsustained pressure rejuvenation (UPR)
- Differences between CableCURE™ fluid, Perficio™ fluid, and Ultrinium™ fluids
- Rejuvenation risk mitigation strategies
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So here is the bottom line in my longest ever post. Flash points and the impact they have on safety are in the public domain. What will you say on the witness stand in defense of your firm when somebody or some frog is hurt by using the least safe technology? To help you on the stand, cut out the handy cheat-sheet below and check all that apply.
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We only care about the lowest price.
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We thought flash point was the point at which a photographer had to use a flash.
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We never looked at the MSDS.
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We had done it this way for over a decade and we never had this problem before.
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The supplier assured us that there was nothing to worry about.
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I always use the oldest technology. I would still be using a rotary phone if I could find one.
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Better safe than sorry,
Thermonuclear Bull Frog